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Limited-Purpose Public Figures:
Spence v. Flynt as an Illustration
of the Need for a More Complete Test

In July of 1985 Gerry Spence, the notorious trial lawyer
from Wyoming, was named "Asshole of the Month" by Hustler
magazine.' Subsequently, Mr. Spence filed suit for defamation
against the publisher of Hustler magazine, Larry Flynt. Part I1
of this note examines the important cases in defamation law
that provide the background for Spence v. F1ynL2 Part I11 discusses the facts of Spence and the reasoning behind the decision. Part IV analyzes why the Wyoming Supreme Court's
suggestion that Gerry Spence is a private figure under a spe~
cial exception for attorneys could lead to unjust r e s ~ l t s .Finally, Part V proposes a three-part test for determining when a
private individual is a limited-purpose public figure. This test
strikes a balance between the vital protection offered by the
First Amendment and the right of individuals without the
opportunity of rebuttal or redress to be free from defamatory
publications.

The leading case in defamation law is New York Times Co.
v. S ~ l l i v a n In
. ~ New York Times, an elected official in Montgomery, Alabama brought suit in state court alleging that he
had been libeled by an advertisement in The New York ~ i r n e s . ~
The advertisement included false statements about police ac-

1. Bits & Pieces, HUSTLER,July 1985, reprinted in Spence v. Flynt, 816 P.2d
771, 793 app. A (Wyo. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1668 (1992).
816 P.2d 771 (Wyo. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1668 (1992).
2.
3. Note that the Wyoming Supreme Court did not explicitly hold that Spence
was a private figure but remanded the case to the district court to decide the
issue. Id. at 779. However, the dicta in Spence discussing attorneys as public figures, id. at 776-77, lends itself to a discussion of the need for a more complete
test to determine if an individual is a limited-purpose public figure in certain circumstances.
4.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
5.
Id. at 256.
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tion allegedly ,directed against students who participated in a
civil rights demonstration and police action against a leader of
the civil rights movement? Sullivan claimed that the statements in the advertisement were defamatory and referred to
him because his duties included supervision of the police department.'
The Supreme Court held that under the First and Fourteenth Amendments a state cannot award damages to a public
official for defamatory statements relating to his official conduct unless that official proves "actual malice." In other words,
the public official must prove that the statement was made
with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of its
truth?
Three years later in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts: the
Supreme Court ruled that defamatory statements concerning
non-public officials may be protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments if the individual defamed has somehow
become a public figure.'' A plurality of the Court stated that a
public figure who is not a public official could recover damages
for a false defamatory statement if its "substance makes substantial danger to reputation apparent, on a showing of highly
unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from
the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered
to by responsible publishers."" This standard was intended to
form a more lenient rule than that required when public officials are involved, but it "failed to gain acceptance by a majoriAs a result of the Butts decision, the actual
ty of the ~ourt."'~
malice test applies to both public figures and public officials.13
The most important decision in the area of public figure
defamation doctrine is Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.14 In Gertz a
Chicago policeman had been convicted of murder, and the
victim's family retained Gertz to represent them in civil litigation against the policeman.15 An article appearing in the
6.
7.
8.
. 9.
10.
11.
12.
Welch,
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 256-59.
Id. at 258.
Id. at 279-80.
388 U.S. 130 (1967).

Id. at 153-55.
Id. at 155 (Harlan, Clark, Stewart, Fortas, JJ.).
Michael J. Gunnison, Note, General Public Figures Since Gertz v. Robert
Inc., 58 ST. JOHN'SL. REV. 355, 362 (1984).
Id. at 362-63.
418 U.S. 323 (1974).

Id. at 325.
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defendant's magazine labeled Gertz a "Communist-fronter" and
alleged that the criminal murder trial was part of a Communist
conspiracy to discredit the local police. I t also stated that Gertz
had helped frame the policeman and implied that Gertz had a
criminal record? Gertz brought a n action for libel."
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Gertz, but the district court held that the actual malice standard of New York
Times applied to the case.'' The court concluded that the actual malice standard protects media discussion of a public issue
whether or not the person defamed is a public official or a public figure. Since Gertz had failed to prove knowledge of falsity
or reckless disregard of truth, judgment notwithstanding the
verdict was entered for the defendant.'' The court of appeals
affirmed the decision of the district court,20but the Supreme
Court reversed.
The Court stated that, first, when a publisher defames a n
individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure,
the publisher may not claim the actual malice standard as
protection against liability even if the defamatory statements
concern an issue of public or general interest?' Second, since
private individuals have less effective opportunities of rebuttal
than do public figures and public officials, they are more susceptible to injury from defamation and the state's interest in
protecting them is greater.22 Third, private figures are more
deserving of recovery because they have not voluntarily exposed themselves to the risk of harm from d e f a m a t i ~ n Fi.~~
nally, the Court stated that Gertz was not a public figure and
that without "clear evidence of general fame or notoriety in the
community, and pervasive involvement in the affairs of society,
a n individual should not be deemed a public figure for all aspects of his life."24 Instead, the public figure issue should be
decided by looking at the "individual's participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the d e f a m a t i ~ n . ' ~ ~

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at

326.
327.
329.
329 & n.2.
331-32.
344-48.
344.
344-45.
352.
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The Court's opinion in Gertz gave rise to the dual concepts
of limited-purpose public figures and general-purpose public
figures. As a result of this classification, courts have adopted a
two-step inquiry in defamation cases. The first inquiry is: Has
the plaintiff achieved "such pervasive fame or notoriety that
[she] becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all cont e x t ~ " ?If~the
~ plaintiff meets this test, then she is a generalpurpose public figure and defamation of any aspect of her life is
subject t o liability only under the actual malice standard. If the
plaintiff is not a general-purpose public figure, a second inquiry
must be undertaken: Has the plaintiff voluntarily injected herself into the controversy which gave rise to the defamati~n?~'
If the plaintiff meets this test, then she is a public figure for
limited purposes and may win a defamation suit only by showing actual malice for those contexts in which she is a limitedpurpose public figure.z8
After the decisions in New York Times and Gertz, one of
the key issues in any defamation litigation is whether the
plaintiff is a public official, a public figure, or a private individual. This classification will determine whether the plaintiff
must prove that the defendant acted with actual malice or
mere negligence.
111. Spence u. Flynt

A. Facts
Gerry Spence represented Andrea Dworkin in her invasion
of privacy suit against Hustler magazine. During the course of
the litigation, Hustler named Gerry Spence "Asshole of the
Month for July7' 1985 and wrote alleged defamatory information concerning him.2g The article attacked Spence's reputa-

26.
Id. a t 351.
27.
Id. a t 352.
28.
Id.
29.
Bits & Pieces, HUSTLER,
July 1985, reprinted in Spence v. Flynt, 816 P.2d
771, 793 app. A Wyo. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1668 (1992). The defamatory
column written about Gerry Spence is as follows:
Many of [those] we name Asshole of the Month are members of that
group of parasitic scum-suckers often referred to as lawyers. [This]
shameless [group] (whose main allegiance is to money) [is] eager to sell
out their personal values, truth, justice and our hard-won freedoms for a
chance to fatten their wallets. The latest of these hemorrhoidal types to
make this page is Jackson, Wyoming, attorney Gerry Spence, our Asshole
of the Month for July.

LIMITED-PURPOSE PUBLIC FIGURES
tion as a "country lawyer" and characterized him as being both
greedy and a phony, claiming his "just folks" and "family values" reputation was merely a front.30 In response to the article, Spence filed a suit for defamation. The district court
granted Flynt's motion for summary judgment and Spence appealed?' The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the summary
judgment, stating that there was a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether or not Spence was a public figure, and accordingly, remanded the case to the district court to decide the

B. Reasoning
Flynt's defense was "structured upon the proposition that
Spence [had] taken up the fight against pornography, thrust
himself into the controversy as a public figure, and [was] therefore subject to response by persons taking the other side."33 In
rejecting this defense, the Wyoming Supreme Court reasoned

Spence dudes himself up in western duds and calls himself a "country
lawyer," but the log-cabin image is . . . phony . . . . [He] is worth millions and owns a 35,000-acre ranch. Spence's claim to fame is that in the
name of "the little guy" he's won some mighty big judgments . . . . He'd
like to add HUSTLER to the list [for Andrea Dworkin] . . . . In her latest publicity-grab, Dworkin has decided to sue HUSTLER for invasion of
among other things.
Dworkin seems to be a n odd bedfellow for "just folks," "family values"
Spence. After all, Dworkin is one of the most foul-mouthed, abrasive
manhaters on Earth. In fact, when Indianapolis contemplated an antiporn
ordinance co-authored by Dworkin, she was asked by its supporters to
stay away for fear her repulsive presence would kill the statute. Spence,
however, can demand as much a s 50% of the take from his cases. And a
possible $75 million would buy a lot of country for this lawyer . . . . [Ilt
appears Gerry "This Tongue for Hire" Spence is more interested in promoting his bank account than the traditional values he'd like us to believe he cherishes.
This case is a nuisance suit initiated by Dworkin, a cry-baby who can
dish out criticism but clearly can't take it. The real issue is freedom of
speech, something we believe even Dworkin is entitled to, but which she
would deny to anyone who doesn't share her views. Any attack on First
Amendment freedoms is harmful to all . . . Spence's foaming-at-the-mouth
client especially. You'd think someone of Spence's stature would know
better than to team up with a censor like Dworkin. Obviously, . . . greed
has clouded [his] senses.
Id.
30
31
32
33.

Id.
Spence, 816 P.2d at 772.
Id. at 776-77.
Id. a t 776.
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that, although the article in Hustler was "imaginative expression" and "rhetorical hyperbole"34 protected under the First
Gerry Spence was
Amendment of the Wyoming Constituti~n,~~
acting on behalf of another individual, "arguably without perThe court stated that in this kind of sitsonal invol~ernent."~~
uation, "there ought to be, and there is, a limit."37The court
noted that whether or not Spence was personally opposed to
pornography was not determinative, since he was only "representing a client who [was] fighting pornography and [was] on
her side only in the sense that he [was] providing professional
services to her."3g Thus, if Spence had been engaged in the
controversy "beyond the confines of the litigation, he may [have
been] subject to appropriate defamatory criticism-fair comHowever, because
ment upon a matter of public c~ncern.'"~
Spence did no more than represent his client in her litigation
against Hustler, there was no constitutional privilege for the
defamatory publication^.^^
The court further reasoned that "[a] professional person,
who may be a 'public figure' for some purposes, should be free
to offer his services to a client as a private professional without
Otherwise, the
being subjected to public figure defamati~n.'~'
lack of protection from defamation would have "a chilling effect
upon attorneys who undertake to represent clients in difficult,
unpopular, high profile, or sensational types of case^.'"^ The
court stated that under these circumstances an attorney "is not
subject to defamation without recourse."43 The court empha-

Id. at 774.
WYO. CONST.art. I, 5 37. The Wyoming Supreme Court also cited to Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 US. 46 (1988), and compared the ad parody in
Falwell to the article in Spence. Spence, 816 P.2d at 774. Falwell involved a suit
filed by Jerry Falwell for defamation against Hustler for its parody of a liquor ad
in which Falwell was portrayed as having engaged in an incestuous drunken rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse. Falwell, 485 US. at 48. The Court in
Falwell held that this "speech" was so outrageous and unbelievable that it was
protected by the First Amendment. The Court further held that Falwell was a
public figure for purposes of First Amendment law and denied his claim for damages. Id. at 57.
36.
Spence, 816 P.2d at 774.
37.
Id.
38.
Id.
39.
Id.
40.
Id.
41.
Id.
42.
Id. at 777.
43.
Id.
34.
35.
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sized that there must be a balance between freedom of speech
and other interests protected by the Constitution and that
"[flree speech cannot equate with the freedom to intimidate,
destroy and defame a n advocate seeking to represent a client."44 The court concluded that a lawyer who is merely a n
advocate for a famous or controversial client is not a public
figure simply because he has taken on that client, and that
under the circumstances of this case and the principles of the
Gertz decision Spence was entitled to his day in court.45
Flynt, in its characterization of Spence as a public figure,
relied i n part upon the publication of Spence's books, Trial by
'
book was pubFire" and With Justice for N ~ n e . ~Neither
lished until after the defamatory article was written." Thus,
the court reasoned that the controversy giving rise to the defamation was Andrea Dworkin's fight against pornography and
that Gerry Spence may not have been a public figure who had
entered the fight against pornography previous to the publication of the Hzlstler article.49

IV. ANALYSIS
A. Attorneys as Public Figures
Several cases have addressed the issue of whether or not
a n attorney becomes a public figure by virtue of her involvement in litigation. If an attorney is a prosecutor, she is often

44.
Id.
45.
Id.
GERRYSPENCE,TRIALBY FIRE: THE TRUESTORYOF A WOMAN'SORDEALAT
46.
THE HANDS OF THE LAW (1986). This book describes a case in which Spence represented Kim Pring, the 1978 Miss Wyoming and a champion baton twirler. Penthouse magazine published a short story about a baton-twirling Miss Wyoming, who
bore a remarkable resemblance to Miss Pring. Miss Pring sued Penthouse International and the author of the story for libel. The jury found for Miss Pring and
awarded her $26.5 million in damages. Id. a t 396-97. However, the decision was
reversed on appeal. Id. a t 446-52; see also Pring v. Penthouse Intl, Ltd., 695 F.2d
438 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983).
47.
FOR NONE:DESTROYING
AN AMERICAN
MYTH
GERRYSPENCE,WITH JUSTICE
(1989).
48.
The article was published in 1985, while the books were published in 1986
and 1989. In order to be a public figure whom publishers are privileged to defame,
absent malice, the party must a t least have been involved in the public controversy
before the defamatory statement was published. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443
U.S. 111, 134-35 (1979); see also Vern Sims Ford, Inc. v. Hagel, 713 P.2d 736, 739
(Wash. Ct. App. 1986) ("[Pllaintiff must be involved in a public controversy before
the defamatory statement is published.").
49.
Spence, 816 P.2d at 776.
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considered to be a public official and must satisfy the New York
Times actual malice standard to maintain a suit for defamation." However, if a private attorney has not thrust herself
into the public controversy surrounding a case, she is a private
figure and can sue under a negligence standard for defamation? The Supreme Court in Gertz held that an attorney is
not a public figure simply because she is an officer of the court,
is active in civic and professional associations, or has published
many books and articles on legal subject^.'^ The Court went
on t o state that an attorney, in order to become a limited-purpose public figure in relation t o the litigation, must thrust herself into the vortex of the public issue or engage the public's
attention in order to influence the outcome of the l i t i g a t i ~ n . ~ ~

B. Defining the Public Figure in Relation
to the Particular Controversy Giving Rise
to the Defamatory Publication
In Spence the court suggested that because Gerry Spence
had not injected himself into the fight against pornography as
an individual, but had only agreed to represent a client involved in the fight against pornography, he was not a public
figure for defamation purposes in relation to that particular

Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., The Press and the Law: Some Issues in Defamation
50.
Litigation Involving Media Coverage of Legal Affairs and Proceedings, 43 SW. L.J.
1011, 1018 (1990).
51.
See, e.g., Western Broadcasting of Augusta, Inc. v. Wright, 356 S.E.2d 53,
54-55 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that an attorney, who never availed himself of
opportunities to present his case informally through news media and did not make
use of whatever notoriety was thrust upon him to influence any public issues, was
not a public figure); Steere v. Cupp, 602 P.2d 1267, 1273-74 (Kan. 1979) (stating
that an attorney who actively represents a client does not become a public figure
for limited purposes without an attempt to gain public attention to influence the
outcome of the controversy); Kurth v. Great Falls Tribune Co., 804 P.2d 393, 395
(Mont. 1991) (stating that an attorney does not become a public figure for defamation purposes merely because she represents a client who is of concern to the public). But cf. Finkelstein v. Albany Herald Publishing Co., 392 S.E.2d 559, 561 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1990) (holding that an attorney who had voluntarily and deliberately
thrust himself into forefront of controversy by appearing on local television program for purpose of discussing problems occurring in specific cases was a public
figure); Hayes v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 295 N.W.2d 858, 865-66 (Mich. Ct. App.
1980) (holding that an attorney, by the manner in which he conducted himself in a
public judicial proceeding and by consenting to television and newspaper interviews, was a public figure and was required to prove actual malice).
Gertz,418U.S. a t 351-52.
52.
53.
Id.
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controver~y.~~
However, in defining whether or not Gerry
Spence was a public figure in relation t o the controversy which
provoked the defamation, the court overlooked the fundamental
reason for which Hustler attacked Mr. Spence.
Hustler attacked Mr. Spence not only for his role as an
attorney representing clients in the fight against pornography,
but also for his role as an attorney in general. Ordinarily attorneys are not public figures solely because of their choice of
profession; Mr. Spence, however, is hardly an ordinary attorney. He is widely known, primarily for his choice of controversial clients:5 his unconventional courtroom tacticsP6 and his
flamboyant style of representation.57Although these charac54.
See supra part 1II.B.
55.
Mr. Spence has represented such controversial and notorious clients as
May 7, 1990, a t
Imelda Marcos, see Paul Moses, Imelda's True Believer, NEWSDAY,
POLK,
8; the surviving children of Karen Silkwood, see GERRYSPENCE& ANTHONY
GERRY SPENCE: GUNNING FOR JUSTICE
(1982); Dave Foreman, see Douglas S.
Looney, Protector or Provocateur?: Dave Foreman, Cofounder of the Radical Group
Earth First!, Faces Trial for Conspiracy, SPORTSILLUSTRATED,
May 17, 1991, a t 54;
and Ed Cantrell, the Wyoming policeman charged with murdering his own undercover agent, a key witness in a drug trial, to keep him from talking to a grand
jury, see Paul Brirtkley-Rogers, Wyoming Jury Acquits City Sheriff on First-Degree
Murder Charge, WASH.POST, Dec. 1, 1979, at C8.
Some of Spence's controversial tactics have included the following: keeping a
56.
box containing "the embalmed leg his plaintiff had lost in t l e accident a t issue" on
t Beach, The Fastest Gun in
the table in front of him during the trial, B e ~ e t H.
the West: Cowboy Attorney Gerry Spence Mows Down Corporate Giants, TIME, Mar.
30, 1981, at 48; arguing with judges, "preceding questions with a brief preamble
about why he is asking them and following them up with remarks such as 'good'
or 'thank you,' " Paul Moses, Will Her Suffering Sway Marcos Jury?, NEWSDAY,
June 3, 1990, a t 8; and making misleading statements to jurors, leading them to
believe that the prosecution may have withheld evidence, William C. Rempel &
Kristina M. Luz, Angry Judge Scolds Marcos Lawyer, L.A. TIMES,May 31, 1990, a t
A22.
Spence is also famous for his unique opening statements, one of which was
three and a half hours long and included a statement which admitted to mistakes
even before the first witness had testified. Moses, supra note 55, a t 8. One of
Spence's opening statements was borrowed for a scene in the movie Legal Eagles
in which a defense attorney played by Robert Redford tricks jurors into admitting
they think his client is guilty before the trial begins. He then gives an inspirational speech on individual rights and persuades the jurors that his client deserves a
fair trial and that they will give his client that right. Catherine M. Spearnak,
Thanks to Message, Lawyers Forgive Film's Distortions, L.A. TIMES (San Diego
County), Mar. 9, 1989, $ 6, at 1.
57.
Spence is described as "commanding." He is six feet, two inches tall and
225 pounds. He moves constantly around the courtroom and speaks in a deep baritone. He likes to illustrate his arguments with props, such as a milking stool
whose legs he removes one at a time to demonstrate how his opponent's case will
collapse. He also enjoys using folksy, country sayings such as "You've got to get
the hogs out of the spring if you want to get the water cleared up." Beach, supra
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teristics are not always factors in determining if an individual
is a public figure, Mr. Spence has used the media throughout
his career to gain notoriety and success.58He has published
four books concerning his cases, his life story, and his methods
Furthermore, although Mr. Spence
of client repre~entation.~'
had not become involved in the controversy regarding pornography and First Amendment rights before the 1985 Hustler article, he had voluntary thrust himself into the public eye as an
attorney with a knack for defending the underdog, "just folks,"
and "family values."60Spence's media exposure prior to 1985
would appear to meet the Gertz standard of "clear evidence of
general fame or notoriety in the community and pervasive involvement in the affairs of society,"61thus classifying Spence
as a public figure. Pervasive involvement in the affairs of soci-

note 56, a t 48.
Prior to 1985 Gerry Spence was notorious in the press as an attorney. See
58.
Chilton Williamson Jr., An American Myth, 1983 NAT'LREV. 332 (reviewing GERRY
SPENCE& ANTHONY
POLK,GERRYSPENCE:GUNNINGFOR JUSTICE
(1982)); Beach,
supra note 56, at 48; Brinkley-Rogers, supra note 55, a t C8; Silkwood Damage
Trial, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 1979, at A5. Not only was Spence notorious in the
papers, but prior to 1985 he also appeared as a guest on the television show "Late
Night With David Letterman." See Sam Merrill, Playboy Interview: David Letterman, PLAYROY, Od. 1984, a t 65, 76.
Since 1985 Gerry Spence has been discussed and quoted in numerous media
articles, see supra notes 55-56. See also Spence, 816 P.2d a t 794-95 app. B, for a
list of media events in which Spence has participated.
59.
GERRY SPENCE& ANTHONY POLK, GERRYSPENCE:GUNNINGFOR JUSTICE
(1982); GERRYSPENCE,OF MURDERAND MADNESS(1983); GERRYSPENCE,TRIALBY
FIRE: THE TRUESTORYOF A WOMAN'SORDEALAT THE HANDS OF THE LAW(1986);
FOR NONE:DESTROYING
AN AMERICAN
MYTH(1989).
GERRYSPENCE,WITH JUSTICE
60.
See GERRYSPENCE& ANTHONY
POLK, GERRYSPENCE:GUNNINGFOR JUSTICE (1982). I n this book Spence commends himself for being a fighter for the
underdog: "I am no longer a prosecutor of men. I save men from blind justice,
which flogs out against the accused with cold iron hands." Id. a t 8. Later in the
book he describes himself as an attorney:
Any trial lawyer can come [in] to the courtroom, demolish a witness, and
perhaps strike a fatal blow to some opponent. But there is the occasional
man who can do his gunfighting with grace and skill and style, which is
an art and transcends the act of killing, which is the ultimate performance in the courtroom.
Id. at 16.
Spence called the Silkwood case "the most important case in history." Williamson, supra note 58, at 333. Spence also stated that the cases in which he
defends crime victims who sue their attackers for civil damages "are as close to
basic historical justice as man has ever known." B e ~ e t H.
t Beach, Getting Status
and Getting Even: The Victims' Movement Forces Some Criminals to Right Wrongs,
TIME, Feb. 7, 1983, a t 40. Spence also discussed his representation of the underdog
with 'I'IME in 1981. See Beach, supra note 56, a t 48.
61.
Gertz, 418 U.S. a t 352.
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ety could also be imputed from Spence's comments that his
cases were of great importance to society and his claim as savior of the underdog.62
Although the article in Hustler may not have been published if Spence had not represented Andrea Dworkin, it did
not attack him solely on that basis. The Hustler article attacked him by pointing out that "Spence dudes himself up i n
western duds and calls himself a 'country lawyer' " while being
"more interested in promoting his bank account than the tradi~ ~ artional values he'd like us to believe he c h e r i ~ h e s . "The
ticle further noted that although Spence has won very large
monetary judgments in the name of the 'little guy," he takes
up to fifty percent of the money awarded?* Gerry Spence, by
seeking publicity as an attorney and benefiting from such publicity, should also be subject to criticism for his notorious techniques and his claim to fame as an attorney who represents
family values and wins cases for the underdog. When one benefits from the media, one must also bear the risk of media criticism.

C. Access to Effective Opportunities for Rebuttal
as a Deciding Factor in Defamation Litigation
The Wyoming Supreme Court ignored the reasoning of
Gertz which stated that the rationale for protecting private figures or limited-purpose public figures is that they have less
effective opportunities for rebuttal and therefore are more vulnerable to injury from d e f a m a t i ~ n . ~ ~
In this particular case, Gerry Spence has ample access to
the media in order to rebut the accusations against his character as an attorney, and he has taken advantage of this opportunity. Few private persons have the opportunity to publish four
books about their lives and careers, nor do they have extensive
media exposure of the job that they perform. Gerry Spence has
had all of these opportunities. If Hustler had defamed him i n
a n area concerning something other than his career as a n attorney, he may have had very little, if any, opportunity to use
the media to rebut the defamation. However, since Hustler's
comments concerned Spence's work as a n attorney, something
62.
63.
64.
65.

See supra note 60.
See supra note 29.
See supra note 29.
Gertz, 418 U.S.at 343-45.
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for which he is famous and receives frequent media coverage,
this should be the least protected area of his life under the
reasoning of Gertz.

V. PROPOSED
THREEPARTTESTTO DETERMINE
WHETHER
DEFAMED
INDIVIDUAL
IS A PUBLIC
FIGURE
This note proposes a three part test to determine whether
a person should be considered a public figure in defamation
litigation when a limited-purpose public figure is involved.
Instead of classifying the pubic figure only according t o the
controversy giving rise to the defamation, the public figure
should also be classified in relation to the subject of defamatory
attack. This dual classification would prevent the media from
being censored when discussing an individual as a public figure
in one area just because the person has not thrust herself to
the forefront of the debate in a given controversy.

A. Did the Plaintiff Voluntarily Inject
Herself into the Particular Controversy
Which Gave Rise to the Defamation?
A court should first inquire whether the subject of an alleged defamatory statement thrust herself into the vortex of
controversy which encouraged the defamation. This is not a
new test; it is simply a restatement of the one established in
GertzG6In many cases the plaintiffs participation in the particular controversy which gave rise to the defamation will be
determinative of whether or not the plaintiff is to be considered
a public figure for the defamation litigation. For example, this
situation may arise where the article defaming the plaintiff
attacks the plaintiff solely for her involvement in the controversy and the article is limited to that issue. In Spence, however,
Hustler attacked Gerry Spence not only for representing
Andrea Dworkin in her invasion of privacy suit against Hustler
but also for his past and present reputation as an attorney and
his previous statements concerning his traditional values and
his representation of the underdog.
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B. Did the Plaintiff Voluntarily Thrust Herself
into the Public Eye on the Subject
Addressed by the Defamatory Article?
Secondly, the court should inquire whether the plaintiff
had voluntarily thrust herself into the public eye on the subject
addressed by the defamatory article. This step of the test acknowledges that a public controversy involving the plaintiff
may give rise to a defamatory article which does not discuss
the plaintiff in light of that particular controversy. Therefore,
this test takes into account the subject of the defamatory article itself, not just the controversy giving rise t o it. This test can
work both ways for plaintiffs. In Spence, Gerry Spence will be
viewed as a public figure in that he is being attacked as an
attorney for his past conduct, but not as a public figure in First
Amendment litigation since he did not voluntarily express his
personal views on this issue. On the other hand, if a plaintiff is
involved in a public controversy and a defamatory article attacks her regarding a subject not related to that controversy,
then the plaintiff is not a public figure for the unrelated subject
even though the controversy the p l a i n t s was involved in as a
public figure gave rise to the publicity which promoted the article.
Of course this particular test would only be effective if the
plaintiff were a limited-purpose public figure under Gertz. If
the plaintiff were a general-purpose public figure on the other
hand, all aspects of her life would be subject to the actual malice standard in defamation litigation.

C. Does the Limited-Purpose Public Figure
Have Effective Opportunities for
Rebuttal Through the Media or Otherwise?
If one of the first two prongs of the test is met, it must be
determined whether the person is t o be considered a limitedpurpose public figure in a particular area. Gertz made it clear
that a private person's lack of access to the media increases a
state's interest in protecting her?? Hence the third test inquires whether the plaintiff has access to the media. This factor becomes extremely important in cases involving attorneys
and other professionals. Although a professional may be well
67.
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known throughout her field, access to media and opportunities
for rebuttal may be limited. An attorney may be well respected,
or even notorious, and still lack the requisite media access t o
be a limited-purpose public figure. However, access to the media should be an important and decisive factor in a case such
as this one; not only is Gerry Spence a well-known attorney,
but he also has access to the media and has thrust himself
voluntarily into the public eye in his role as an attorney.
Active use of this third prong would help protect that
which the Wyoming Supreme Court seemed so concerned about
in its decision-the chilling effect upon attorneys taking on
high profile, controversial, or unpopular clients. This third
prong would also protect professional attorneys who do not
voluntarily seek fame and notoriety through the media and
who do not have access to it for rebuttal. So long as they have
not met the required elements of the test, these attorneys
would feel fiee to take on controversial cases without the fear
that defamatory statements would be made about them or their
personal lives.
VI. CONCLUSION
This note concludes that, under the precedent-setting case
of Gertz, Gerry Spence is a limited-purpose public figure in his
role as a professional and as an attorney, but not as an individual in First Amendment litigation.
This note also suggests a three-part test to determine if an
individual is a limited-purpose public figure in regards t o particular defamatory statements and publications. First, did the
plaintiff voluntarily inject herself into the controversy giving
rise to the defamatory publication or statement? Second, did
the plaintiff voluntarily thrust herself into the public eye on
the subject addressed by the defamatory publication? If one of
these two tests has been met, the court must then determine if
the plaintiff has sufficient access to the media or other means
for effective rebuttal. If so, the plaintiff is considered a limitedpurpose public figure for purposes of the defamatory litigation
in question, and actual malice must be shown to win the suit.
This test strikes a balance between the vital protection
offered by the First Amendment and the right of private individuals who lack the opportunity for rebuttal or redress t o be
free fiom malicious and false publications.
Stacey L.Hayden

